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Telecommunications Infrastructure
Development in Pennsylvania: A
Prescription for Effective Regulatory
Reform
I. Introduction
The widespread economic, social and cultural benefits of an
advanced telecommunications infrastructure are largely undisputed.' The
transmission of voice, data and video images in seemingly endless
quantities through a single telecommunications network would potentially
benefit all sectors of American society.2 The advantages of a highly
developed telecommunications infrastructure are especially promising for
largely rural states such as Pennsylvania, where an advanced network
would offer equal access to an increasingly global economy, provide
increased employment opportunities, and improve standards of living.3
Substantial controversy exists, however, over the proper balance
between the diverse and competing interests involved in the development
of an advanced telecommunications network.4 Pennsylvania's present
1. Christine Rathbun, Telecommunications Policy 1-2 (April 23, 1992) (unpublished policy
memorandum on file with the Senate of Pennsylvania Majority Caucus Policy Development and
Research Office). See also NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE ASS'N, THE NTIA
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 21 (1991)
[hereinafter NTIA REPORT). Most regulators, legislators and policy experts involved in the
infrastructure debate agree that an advanced telecommunications infrastructure, on both the federal
and state levels, is a laudable policy goal. See it Moreover, the evolution of the global economy
and the growth of information-intensive industries has moved the infrastructure issue to the forefront
of federal and state economic development efforts. See id. at 23-24.
2. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-27, 35-41, 46-86. An advanced telecommunications
infrastructure would benefit the education and health care sectors of the economy through distance
learning programs, interactive video services and the "sharing" of advanced technologies. Id. at 46-
86. In the home, an advanced telecommunications network utilizing fiber optic cable could offer high
definition television, home banking services, movies-on-demand, work-at-home services and home
shopping. See Rathbun, supra note 1, at 6.
3. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RURAL
AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: NETWORKING FOR THE FUTURE 5-15 (1991).
4. The present controversy involves whether certain industries and technologies will dominate
the marketplace of the future and which regulatory strategies will be utilized to ensure adequate
network modernization, ample consumer protection and free competition among service providers.
This paper will advocate a solution based primarily upon the development of the public switched
telephone network (PSTN) and the regulation of local telephone companies, or local exchange carriers
(LECs).
Public switched telephone network technology is available to all users at a relatively low cost
and is virtually universal because it utilizes a single standard interface for all users. PRICE
WATERHOUSE AND NAT'L ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASsoc., INC., ELECTRONIC HIGHWAYS: PROVIDING
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1993
regulatory framework is the result of developments in the
telecommunications industry nationally since the 1930's. The natural
monopoly model,5  which formed the theoretical foundation of
Pennsylvania's rate-of-return regulatory scheme, has been gradually
eroded by regulatory pricing policies, increased competition, and the rapid
pace of technological improvements.6 Most states have already begun
to implement alternative regulation proposals, either through independent
regulatory action or in response to legislative mandates.7 After almost
two years of debate, Pennsylvania's General Assembly recently passed
legislation to deregulate competitive services provided by local exchange
carriers (LECs) and to permit alternative forms of regulation for non-
competitive services.8 Pennsylvania now stands at a crossroads, as the
Public Utility Commission (PUC) is faced with the awesome task of
defining the contours of the state's rapidly evolving and ever-changing
telecommunications marketplace.
Even before the General Assembly formally authorized alternative
regulation, the PUC began to adapt its policies to the changed economies
of the telecommunications landscape. 9 However, the PUC's longstanding
reliance on a cost-of-service ratemaking scheme has hampered the ability
of Pennsylvania's LECs to invest in network modernization.' In
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PENNSYLVANIA'S FUTURE 1-91, 2-48 (1991)
(telecommunications infrastructure study initiated by Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and
Industry). For example, in Pennsylvania, every business and 97% of residential households subscribe
to the PSTN. FCC INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS DIVISION, TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES (1992). This comment presumes that the ubiquity, uniformity and universality of the PSTN
make it the most effective mechanism for the development of an advanced telecommunications
infrastructure. See PRICE WATERHOUSE at 1-91.
5. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
6. For a complete discussion of the natural monopoly concept and its application to
telecommunications regulation, see 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 113-26 (2d ed. 1989).
7. "By 1991, 45 states had proposed some type of regulatory reform to stimulate the
development of telecommunications infrastructure. At least half of the states have enacted some type
of reform." COMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ECONOMIC DEV. PARTNERSHIP BD.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE KEYSTONE STATE: A REPORT ON PENNSYLVANIA'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE at v (1992).
8. See Act of July 8, 1993, No. 67 [hereinafter Act 67] H.B. 84, 176th Leg., 1993 Session.
The newly passed Pennsylvania legislation allows the PUC to effectively deregulate LEC services
that have been found sufficiently competitive. Id at § 3005. Rates for noncompetitive services must
be regulated according to a variety of price stability mechanisms, including indexes, formulas, zones
of rate freedom, and streamlined ratemaking plans. Id. at § 3004. In return for relaxed regulation,
participating LECs must develop a universally available broadband telecommunications network by
2015. Id. at § 3005.
9. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
10. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 6-8. For a general discussion of the incompatibility of rate-of-
return regulation and the structure of the present telecommunications industry nationally, see Alfred
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response to the General Assembly's mandate, Pennsylvania must now
depart from cost-of-service ratemaking and alter its regulation of LECs
to respond to the evolving telecommunications marketplace." A
successful regulatory scheme for Pennsylvania LECs would (1) authorize
alternative methods of regulating Pennsylvania's LECs; (2) provide
sufficient incentives for network modernization, including the
development and implementation of new technologies; (3) protect
consumers by avoiding unfair pricing and ensuring the universal
availability of basic telephone service; and (4) promote free and fair
competition between a variety of alternative technologies and service
providers.
This paper will focus first on the history of telecommunications
regulation and the gradual erosion of the natural monopoly model of
telecommunications regulation. Second, it will examine the flaws of
Pennsylvania's rate-of-return method of regulation and will discuss why
cost-of-service ratemaking is an inefficient option in today's increasingly
competitive marketplace. Third, it will assess Pennsylvania's regulatory
posture in comparison with other states and nations. Finally, this paper
will define the primary objectives of regulatory reform and will analyze
which elements should be incorporated into Pennsylvania's developing
regulatory landscape.
II. Natural Monopoly Theory: The Development of Competition
Through Early Policies of Residual Pricing
Telecommunications regulation developed at a time when local
telephone companies were considered natural monopolies 2 because
"economies of scale and operating efficiency dictate[d] that there be
[only] one telephone service provider in any given geographic area."'
3
In a natural monopoly setting, regulation acts as a substitute for
competition. Regulators seek to simulate the workings of a competitive
E. Kahn, Telecommunications, Competitiveness and Economic Development-What Makes us
Competitive?, PuB. UT1L. FORT., September 13, 1990, 13, 15-16; Harry M. Shooshan,
Telecommunications Modernization and the Nation's Infrastructure: Charting a New Course for
Regulation and Public Policy in the United States, 12 (December 11, 1989) (unpublished article on
file with National Economic Research Associates) (citing specific disincentives for network
modernization in competitive marketplace under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking).
11. See infra text part IV.
12. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 3.
13. Ild There is some debate, however, about whether LECs were ever really natural
monopolies. The essential element of a natural monopoly has been defined as decreasing unit costs
over the entire extent of the market. KAHN, supra note 6, at 123. However, telephone companies,
at least in the short term, are sometimes subject to increasing unit costs as subscribership increases.
Id.
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economic marketplace and protect consumers from exploitive pricing
practices. 4 Regulatory discretion is limited, however. Rates which do
not permit a utility to earn a fair return on its investment are inherently
confiscatory and violate constitutional guarantees of due process."5
The Communications Act of 193416 established the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) as the primary federal regulatory
mechanism for the telecommunications industry and set a national policy
goal of high quality, universal telephone service at a reasonable cost. 7
Consequently, basic local telephone service was regulated in accordance
with the objective of achieving universal service. Residual pricing
charged basic residential services at artificially low levels in order to
encourage affordable universal service."8 These revenue losses were
typically counterbalanced by high prices for long-distance or business
services, which were considered outside the scope of basic telephone
service.' 9
14. KAHN, supra note 6, at 1. Regulation of utilities was originally justified by the "public"
nature of their mission and by the structure and characteristics of the regulated industries. See Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (establishing public interest as justification for government regulation
of public utilities).
15. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (defining limits on agency
discretion and scope of review in rate determinations); Bluefield Waterworks and Improvement Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (establishing constitutional limitations to
rate relief).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
17. li
18. The most often used example of residual pricing involves basic local service
(dial tone plus local calling) and long distance service rates. Over the years
the cost of long distance calls has decreased. However, rather than decreasing
long distance rates accordingly as cost of service would dictate, much of this
long distance revenue has been used by regulatory bodies to provide a subsidy
for basic local service. For example, consider a case where basic local service
costs $10. Assuming $3 of surplus toll revenue were available, the basic local
service would be residually priced at $7.
JAMES H. CAWLEY AND NORMAN J. KENNARD, RATE CASE HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO UTILITY
RATEMAKING BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION 30 (1983) (published by
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission).
19. It is a generally accepted principle of public utility ratemaking that differences
in the conditions of demand, as among the respective customer classes,
indicate that each class has a different capacity and willingness to bear
charges. Accordingly, with reference to value-of-service factors, rates are
made so as to distribute the approved company-wide cost of service in relation
to the capacity and willingness of customer groups to bear such costs... In
addition, the operation of the value-for-service principle in utility ratemaking
extends to the earning of different rates of profit from different classes of
customers of service, within the framework of the overall return approved
under regulation.
Id. at 29 (quoting P. GARFIELD AND W.F. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 143 (1964)).
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Residual pricing resulted in enhanced opportunities for specialized
carriers, who were not required to set prices above actual costs, to
compete directly with regulated LECs.20 The FCC gradually shifted
from a policy of "regulated monopoly to regulated competition.' In
1963, the FCC took the first step toward fostering more market
competition by permitting Microwave Communications International, Inc.
(MCI) to develop a private microwave network22 between Chicago and
St.Louis in order to service specialized business customers as a common
carrier.23 MCI's application was granted despite the fact that the
company's network directly competed with services available from Bell
and Western Union.24 In 1969, the FCC took an additional step toward
a competitive marketplace by permitting a private radio service to connect
to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 2' and to market its
equipment directly to Bell's customers.26
The artificial subsidies of residual pricing and the FCC's early
willingness to depart from a pure natural monopoly model substantially
increased the competitiveness of many telecommunications services.27
At the same time, however, technological changes were underway which
were also making market entry easier for potential competitors, thus
increasing the competitiveness of the telecommunications marketplace.
20. Id.
21. CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at M3.
22. A microwave communications network uses radio waves as a transmission medium rather
than copper wires or fiber-optic strands. Id at 27.
23. In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
24. Id. The FCC granted MCI's permit by a four to three vote, but the Commission
acknowledged the potential policy difficulties involved in opening up the public switched telephone
network (PSTN) to competition from unregulated carriers. See id at 966. The majority justified its
holding on the specialized nature of MCI's service, the benefits to consumers from market
competition and the continued need to modernize and develop the PSTN. See &L at 964-65. See also
In the Matter of Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959)
(permitting private applicants to operate microwave facilities in frequencies previously reserved for
regulated common carriers). In Above 890, the FCC held that private applicants should be permitted
to utilize alternative technologies to provide specialized services to customers if they could do so
more efficiently than a regulated provider. Id. at 404. The artificial system of subsidies created by
the residual pricing of services provided ample opportunities for competition in certain high traffic
and long-distance routes. CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 30. These routes were
generally priced well above cost in order to artificially reduce the cost of basic residential telephone
service. Id.
25. See note 4, supra.
26. In the Matter of Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). In Carterfone, the FCC struck down Bell's tariff provision prohibiting
interconnection to the PSTN. Id. "A customer desiring to use an interconnecting device.., should
be able to do so, so long as the interconnection does not adversely affect the telephone company's
operations or the telephone system's utility for others." Id. at 424.
27. See CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at M3.
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III. Technological Development and the Continued Erosion of Natural
Monopolies
Telephone cable has traditionally been composed of pairs of twisted
copper wires which carry transmission signals from a central office switch
to a subscriber's home or office.28 In recent years, the development of
alternative transmission mediums, such as satellite, microwave and fiber
optic technologies, has revolutionized the telecommunications industry.29
Many carriers have ambitiously deployed fiber-optic cable, which has the
capacity to carry vast amounts of information at a very low cost.'
Fiber-optics will undoubtedly increase the quantity and variety of services
that can be offered to subscribers over the PSTN.3t Unlike copper
cable, fiber is capable of easily carrying large quantities of voice, video
and data transmissions simultaneously.32
In conjunction with the development of fiber optics and other
alternative transmission systems, many telecommunications providers
have deployed digital switches to replace older, more conventional
switching technologies.33 Digital switches process transmissions in a
bitstream or binary format and are more compatible with advanced
telecommunications and computer functions.34 They can also process
greater quantities of information more quickly than conventional analog
technology.
35
The evolution of digital technology and the use of the PSTN as a
medium for the transmission of voice, video and data communications has
blurred the distinction between data processing and telecommunications
functions. The FCC abandoned its attempts to distinguish between
28. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 92.
29. Id.
30. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-91.
31. Id.
32. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1. at 94. "[lIt will be a very long time before the capacity of
fiber optic cable is exhausted-so long that no one today is predicting when that time might arrive."
Rathbun, supra note 1, at 5.
33. "The switching component, or switching fabric, consists of the actual elements used in
making and breaking physical connections." NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 109 n.435. The first
automatic switching device was invented in 1881. Id. at n.436. Prior to 1881, manual switching was
required. Id Digital switches are now the technology of choice for both public and private
networks. Id. at 111.
34. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at I11.
35. Id. Improving a switching system allows the PSTN to support Advanced Intelligent
Network Services. For example, Bell Atlantic's CLASS services, which are utilized by pushing the
"star" button on a touch-tone telephone, are largely dependent on advanced switching technology.
Id. In addition, switching improvements provide a framework for the provision of advanced services
between different exchange carriers (inter-LATA). Such services include video conferencing, high
definition television and digital audio broadcasting. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-95.
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communications and data processing services for regulatory purposes in
its Second and Third Computer Inquiries.36 In so doing, the FCC
essentially deregulated all "enhanced" network services that involved the
storage, processing or restructuring of information.37 The FCC also
detariffed customer premises equipment (CPE),38 finding that the
regulation of CPE had created artificially high prices for interstate
services and that sufficient competition among CPE providers had
developed to justify its deregulation. 39  Recently, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court removed an additional barrier to competition by
permitting the divested Bell Operating Companies to market enhanced
computer information services directly to subscribers.' The gradual
blending of computer and telecommunications technologies has led to
significant regulatory changes on the federal level and has fostered
competition among service providers.
Two general trends have become evident regarding the impact of
technological development on telecommunications competition. First,
different transmission mediums have greatly enhanced the potential uses
of the PSTN. Networks are being used to transmit increasingly large
quantities of voice, data and video communications simultaneously. As
36. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d
384, 35 P.U.R.4th 143 (1980), recon., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),further recon., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981).
affd sub nom., Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n. v. F.C.C., 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982) [hereinafter Computer II]; Amendment to Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, 104 F.CC.2d 958 (1986), recon., 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987), further recon., 3 F.C.C.R.
1135 (1988), vacated and remanded sub nom., California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter Computer III].
37. See Computer II, supra. Under Computer II, all network services were classified as either
"basic" or "enhanced." Id. Basic services, which provide a transmission path for the movement of
information, were regulated in the traditional manner. Id. However, enhanced services, which were
defined as any network service constituting more than basic transmissions, were removed from
regulation. Id. Enhanced services encompass the range of computer applications which provide
additional, different, or restructured information to the network subscriber. CAWLEY AND KENNARD,
supra note 18, at M4. In Computer III, the Commission eliminated many of Computer Iis structural
separation requirements and permitted the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to engage in the sale
and marketing of enhanced services. Computer III, supra note 36.
38. Customer premise equipment includes the telephones and switchboard equipment located
at the cutomer's residence or business. CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 29.
39. Computer II, supra note 36. Prior to Computer I1, all costs attributable to CPE were
included in a carrier's rate base and were ultimately borne by ratepayers. CAWLEY & KENNARD,
supra note 18, at M7. The FCC cited increasing market competition as a primary motivation for
detariffing CPE. CAWLEY & KENNARD, supra note 18, at M8.
40. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 283, 305-07 (1990) (lifting ban on Bell
Operating Company provision of information services). The ban on the Bell Operating Companies'
entry into the information services market was originally part of the Modified Final Judgment and
Consent Decree which divested AT&T. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227-28 (1982).
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a result, the industry has and will continue to become more
competitive.4 Providers of enhanced services will seek to compete with
the Bell Operating companies directly or, alternatively, utilize the PSTN
to deliver specialized services to subscribers. The conversion of most
communications into a bitstream format as well as the miniatunzation and
increasing affordability of powerful computer technologies has made
market entry much more affordable.42
Second, in the post-divestiture era, the FCC has shown an increasing
willingness to allow market forces to control the structure of the evolving
telecommunications marketplace.43 The FCC recognized the evolving
trend toward competition early and has now altered its regulatory scheme
in favor of a more flexible price cap approach."
IV. The Limitations of Pennsylvania's Cost-of-Service Ratemaking
Scheme
In accordance with the Public Utility Code, Pennsylvania regulates
LECs according to a traditional fixed rate-of-return scheme.4 5  Rate-of-
return regulation has its roots in the natural monopoly theory,46 even
though the monopoly characteristics of LECs have significantly
41. See NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 205, 207-08. The FCC's departure from a natural
monopoly philosophy has been quite dramatic. In 1988, the average business user could select from
1,349 different kinds of CPE, which represents an increase of fifty-eight percent since 1975. Id. at
205. There are now more than 440 long-distance (interexchange) carriers nationally, and the price
of ordinary long-distance service for the residential user has declined almost 45% since divestiture.
Id at 207-08; see also Hearings on House Bill 2437, P.N. 3150 and House Bill 2441, P.N. 3154
Before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Consumer Affairs Comm., 175th Leg., 1992
Session 2 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Richard D'Antonio, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Telephone Association) [on file with PA House Consumer Affairs Committee].
42. See generally NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 205.
43. Local exchange carriers are subject to state and federal regulation, but are primarily
regulated on the state level. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1 at 212. While competition has burgeoned
on the interexchange (long-distance) level, most LECs still retain many characteristics of a natural
monopoly. Id. Certain services, such as the provision of basic residential telephone service, are often
provided without any competition. Id. at 212.
44. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873 (1989).
Rather than regulating on the basis of earnings, price caps focus specifically on the carrier's pricing
of services. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
45. Traditional rate-of-return regulation attempts to set rates to give utilities a reasonable
opportunity to recover costs incurred in providing service. The revenue requirement of a utility is
set equal to the company's expenses plus a return on investment. This return on investment is
calculated by multiplying the cost of capital to the company (rate of return) by the net assets
dedicated to the public use (rate base). See CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 151; see also
66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 et seq. (1990).
46. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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deteriorated.47 Consequently, the PUC's reliance on cost-of-service
ratemaking has created disincentives for network modernization and has
hampered the technological development of the PSTN.
Rate-of-return regulation requires the PUC to carefully scrutinize the
costs historically incurred by LECs in providing telephone service.48
Under rate-of-return regulations, a company is permitted to earn a limited
return on its investment if it can prove to the PUC that the investment is
needed for the provision of telephone service to the public.49 In order
to modernize an existing facility or service, a service provider must
assure the PUC that new demands have arisen that make the
developments "used and useful" to the public service."0
Under rate-of-return regulation, there is little incentive for telephone
companies to invest in network modernization or to introduce new
products and services.5 ' In an increasingly competitive marketplace,
cost-based regulation skews a utility's return on its investment.5 2 If the
investment fails or if the utility is unable to prove an appropriate demand
increase to justify the additional expense, it will be disallowed. On the
other hand, if the investment is approved by the PUC, the carrier is
limited to a predetermined "fair return. 53 A company's shareholders
suffer if regulators disagree with the LEC's capital investments, but at the
same time, its investors are prohibited from receiving large financial
windfalls after regulatory approval.'M
This problem is compounded by Pennsylvania's policy of setting a
single rate of return on the total value of a utility's rate base." The
47. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 6.
48. Id. See also Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 408 A.2d 917, 920
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (outlining mathematical calculations necessary to set telephone rates in
Pennsylvania).
49. Rathbun, supra note 1 at 6. This doctrine is commonly referred to as the "prudence
principle," which permits :he PUC to disallow "imprudent" expenses in an ex-post facto fashion.
These costs are then removed from the rate base and are not borne by ratepayers.
50. See, e.g., Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 478 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984) (denying company recovery of Business Information Systems Payments to
affiliated Bell Laboratories because services were not yet rendered and in public service).
51. "[C]ompetitive services offered by the telephone companies continue to be subject to
traditional rate-of-return regulation which, in a competitive environment, discourages investment and
limits the company's ability to respond to marketplace pressures." Hearings, supra note 41, at 3
(statement of William Harral, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Bell of Pennsylvania); see
also Shooshan, supra note 10, at 12.
52. Shooshan, supra note 10, at 12.
53. Id. "The asymmetry of regulatory treatment obviously makes risky investments less
attractive for regulated firms. The investment climate these firms experience is very much a 'heads,
I win a little, tails, I lose a lot' proposition." Id.
54. Id.
55. The Pennsylvania PUC sets a single rate of return for a public utility based upon its
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PUC calculates a single rate of return; it does not set different rates of
return for different services based upon existing market competition or
other relevant factors.56 Still, LECs predicate their investment decisions
on the rate of return set by the PUC.57 As a result, carriers have little
incentive to make risky decisions regarding network modernization or to
invest in new technologies. 58 In addition, the composite rate of return
utilized by the PUC imputes earnings from non-network services and
further discourages network modernization.59
The Pennsylvania PUC sets depreciation schedules for much of the
infrastructure of LECs.60 Depreciation rates are critical to
telecommunications infrastructure development because they reflect the
portion of the total plant or equipment expense which may be included
in the rate base and charged to ratepayers. t The allowable rate of
depreciation is calculated based upon the average estimated life of plant
or equipment.62
The cost-plus nature of rate-of-return regulation encourages state
regulatory commissions to underestimate legitimate costs. 63  Changes in
depreciation schedules usually result in higher rates for consumers,
calculation of the "overall cost of capital." CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 256-57. After
the revenue requirement has been determined, the distribution of any rate increase among the various
customer classes is determined through cost-of-service considerations and application of the residual
pricing policy's universal service objective. Id
56. There is an especially serious problem created by the application of rate-of-
return regulation in Pennsylvania which bears directly on incentives for
investment in telecommunications infrastructure. The Pennsylvania PUC sets
a rate of return for telephone companies based on all intrastate services subject
to its jurisdiction. It is this rate of return which governs a telephone
company's investment decisions.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 3-20.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The effect of Pennsylvania's regulatory policy will become more dramatic as more
states modify traditional cost-of-service ratemaking and competition between alternative carriers and
technologies increases.
60. See CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 186.
61. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 6.
62. Id. The Pennsylvania PUC has traditionally utilized the "straight line depreciation" method.
Id. at 6. The capital used to purchase utility plant is recovered from ratepayers and repaid to
shareholders over the useful life of the asset. Id. For example, if a utility borrows $100 from
investors to buy a piece of equipment and the PUC determines that the useful life of the equipment
is 5 years, the depreciation expense on the equipment is $20 per year for 5 years. See CAWLEY AND
KENNARD, supra note 18, at 186. As the depreciation expense is recovered, it is cumulatively
deducted from the value of the rate base so that a return will no longer be earned on the expenditure.
Id.
63. Shooshan, supra note 10, at 13.
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thereby violating the universal service principle. 64 Long depreciation
schedules restrict the ability of LECs to earn a competitive profit on
network investment and to reinvest in network modernization.65
Consequently, regulated firms expose themselves to substantial risks by
installing new technologies before their old plant has been fully
depreciated.66 The result of this arrangement is an overall reluctance by
LECs to invest in network development and a need for frequent rate
increases if a company overcapitalizes.67 The Pennsylvania PUC has a
long history of imposing artificially long depreciation schedules, thereby
lowering depreciation expenses, slowing the introduction of new
technologies, and subjecting the carrier to unnecessary financial risk.6
Rate-of-return regulation has created a non-uniform pattern of
network modernization in Pennsylvania.69 Geographical disparities have
arisen between Pennsylvania's forty-one LECs and the various services
they are now capable of offering. 0 Services which depend upon
enhanced digital switching and fiber technologies are scattered in a
patchwork manner throughout the state, with heavy concentrations of
advanced technologies in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh regions.7'
Pennsylvania is a predominantly rural state72, and the widening gap
between the information "haves" and "have nots" has serious implications
for the state's future economic development.
73
64. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 8.
65. Id Low depreciation rates engender difficulties in earning a fair return on a utility's rate
base. The impact of artificial depreciation schedules is especially dramatic in a competitive market,
where unregulated entities can offer services to network subscribers without depreciation restrictions.
66. In an environment of accelerated technological advancement, if older assets are
undepreciated and not fully recovered, then a company's rate base and prices are inflated beyond that
which a competitor, who has no such regulatory restrictions, may charge. Shooshan, supra note 10,
at 13.
67. Id.
68. For example, the Pennsylvania PUC depreciates the copper cable used by most LECs over
28 years. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 8. Under rate-of-return regulation, the company is required to
depreciate the cost of installing the wire over this period, even though copper may be less
technologically desirable and less efficient than fiber. See id
69. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 2-36, 2-39.
70. Id at 2-37 (Table 1) (showing breakdown of advanced network services offered and degree
of network modernization undertaken by each of Pennsylvania's LECs).
71. Id at 2-41 to 2-44 (Figures 20-23). These charts show the geographical distribution of total
digital lines, fiber feeder routes, fiber inter-office facilities, and central offices equipped with
Signaling System 7 (SS7) technology.
72. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7, 13-15 (discussing diverse
communications needs of rural areas and impact of state regulatory policy on network modernization
and infrastructure improvement); PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 2-16.
73. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-31 to 1-33 (citing importance of infrastructure
development to rural areas as catalyst for economic development). Pennsylvania's rate-of-return
regulation has discouraged the development of the PSTN in rural areas. For example, the town of
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW . FALL 1993
The application of rate-of-return regulation is mathematically and
administratively complex. A rate case is a time-consuming and
burdensome procedure which costs Pennsylvania's LECs and ultimately
their ratepayers inordinate sums of money.74 The expenses involved in
filing a rate case are typically included in a company's operating
expenses and are often at least partially absorbed by ratepayers." Small
telephone companies suffer disproportionately because the costs of
preparing and litigating a request for rate relief are distributed among
fewer subscribers.76 The complexity, expense and inherent uncertainty
of the PUC's rate case procedure have contributed to the reluctance of
LECS to make capital investments which might ultimately require rate
relief.
77
V. Network Modernization in Pennsylvania: The Breezewood Rate
Case and the Path to Regulatory Reform
Pennsylvania's Public Utility Commission has recently changed the
way certain telecommunications entities under its jurisdiction are
regulated. The PUC has undertaken these changes independently and
without legislative action by the General Assembly.78 For instance, the
Commission approved a "rate cap" mechanism for telecommunications
resellers, who own no transmission facilities but merely resell services
using the facilities of other carriers. 79  The PUC now regulates
Bloomsburg proposed the construction of a high capacity digital highway connecting its area
businesses and Bloomsburg University to Harrisburg. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra
note 3, at 128. The proposed network would support high speed data transmission, high resolution
graphics, and compressed motion video. Id. Even though the PSTN could accommodate the town's
needs, Bloomsburg officials believed that the pricing policies and constraints of Pennsylvania's
regulatory system made construction of a private network more economical. Id. Ultimately, the town
opted for building its own network rather than convincing their LEC that the community could
generate sufficient demand to justify the new investment and guarantee a fair return to the company.
Id. "[R]egulatory decisions will continue to determine whether rural areas have access to advanced
telecommunications and, hence, whether they can participate fully in the global marketplace." Id
at 115.
74. See Hearings, supra note 41, at 5 (statement of Richard D'Antonio, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Telephone Association); see also 66.PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (1990) (discussing procedural
aspects of rate case filing).
75. See CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at 192 (discussing methods of including costs
of rate case in utility operating expenses).
76. See Hearings, supra note 41 at 5 (statement of Richard D'Antonio, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Telephone Association).
77. Id.
78. Hearings, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of David W. Rolka, Chairman, Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission).
79. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the role of resellers in the telecommunications
marketplace, see CAWLEY AND KENNARD, supra note 18, at M13.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
interexchange carriers on an operating cost basis rather than through a
traditional rate-of-return methodology.8s In addition, the Commission
has begun to address the problem of depreciation rates by modifying its
depreciation schedules to encourage LECs to invest in network
modernization. t
However, the PUC has been reluctant to adopt a comprehensive
statewide strategy for regulatory reform that is not grounded in rate-of-
return regulation.82  The Breezewood Telephone Company (BTC), a
small local exchange carrier serving approximately 34,000 access lines,
filed a rate request in 1990 which included a unique Network
Modernization Proposal.83 Specifically, BTC requested a streamlined
ratemaking plan which would prospectively authorize future rate increases
based on specified levels of demonstrated new investment and service.84
In exchange for the PUC's guarantee of rate relief, BTC promised to
spend $3.5 million over four years to upgrade its antiquated network with
digital switches and universal private line service.85
The Breezewood case posed a direct challenge to rate-of-return
regulation in Pennsylvania. Specifically, BTC sought to avoid the large
administrative expenses inherent in filing rate cases by guaranteeing its
80. The regulation of interexchange (IXC), or long-distance carriers, on a different basis than
LECs has produced some confusion in Pennsylvania's telecommunications industry. If the PUC can
independently institute an alternative regulatory scheme for IXCs, why was new legislation required
under the current Code to depart from rate-of-return for LECs? In his testimony before the House
Consumer Affairs Committee, however, Chairman Rolka downplayed the regulatory distinction
between IXCs and LECs. Rolka claimed that the regulation of IXCs was "theoretically" performed
on an operating ratio basis but that "most IXC tariff filings... receive minimal scrutiny and routine
approval." Hearings, supra note 41, at 2. (statement of David W. Rolka, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission).
81. The PUC has now adopted remaining life and equal life group depreciation rates for LECs.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 3-20. These rates are more reflective of actual economic life.
They allow LECs to recoup investments more rapidly and encourage greater investment in network
development. Id. Nonetheless, the problem of depreciation schedules as an inherent disincentive to
network modernization is inextricably linked to rate-of-return regulation itself and will not be
completely remedied until alternatives to cost-of-service ratemaking are employed. See id.
82. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Breezewood Tel. Co., No. R-901666 135 (Pa. P.U.C.
Jan. 4, 1991) (Opinion and Order).
83. Id
84. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n. v. Breezewood Tel. Co., No. R-901666 161 (Pa.
P.U.C. Nov. 6, 1990) (Recommended Decision of A.L.J. Meehan) [hereinafter Breezewood A.LJ.
Opinion]. Prior to its 1990 filing, BTC had not had a rate increase since 1957. Breezewood, No.
R-901666 1 (Pa. P.U.C. Jan. 4, 1991) (Fischl, F., dissenting) [hereinafter Breezewood Dissent]. The
company had begun to upgrade its network by installing new cable and by replacing its 1950's era
analog switching equipment. Id
85. Breezewood Dissent, supra note 84, at 1. BTC had the highest number of multi-party
subscribers in the Commonwealth prior to its 1990 rate case. See id. at 2-3. Because outside plant
was severely constrained, many BTC subscribers did not have private line service. See id
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recovery of the large capital investment associated with the network
improvements." However, Administrative Law Judge Robert L.
Meehan initially denied BTC's Network Modernization Proposal. 7
Meehan concluded that rates in excess of a "fair return" as determined by
the PUC under rate-of-return regulation would be unlawful under
Pennsylvania's Public Utility Code.88 The PUC subsequently upheld
Meehan's reasoning and affirmed his Recommended Decision. 89
In a strong dissent, Commissioner Frank Fischl disagreed with the
majority's approach.' Fischl chastised the majority for mistakenly
stressing form over substance and concluded that the PUC had the
necessary authority under the Code to unilaterally approve BTC's
Network Modernization Proposal. 9t
The Breezewood decision engendered an ongoing debate about the
proper interpretation of Pennsylvania's Public Utility Code.92 The Code
86. See Breezewood A.LJ. Opinion, supra note 84, at .135.
87. Id. at 183-85. Meehan did, however, recognize the problems posed by Pennsylvania's rigid
application of rate-of-return regulation. Id. at 185. However, he concluded that legislative action to
change the Code was necessary since the PUC could not unilaterally abandon rate-of-return
principles. Id.
I agree with BTC that the current method of rate regulation in this Commonwealth
imposes substantial costs on a utility, and ultimately, its ratepayers in prosecuting a case
for rate relief. I concur in BTC's observation that there should be some alternative to this
process which would permit rate relief, when needed, in a more streamlined fashion ....
However, given the statutory provisions of the Code, as interpreted by the appellate
courts, it would appear that the Code would have to be amended to vest the Commission
with the necessary discretion to approve requests for rate relief on a basis other than rate
base regulation. In the absence of any statutory authority vesting the Commission with
the legal ability to approve the NMP [Network Modernization Plan] proposed by BTC,
I have no alternative but to recommend that the Commission reject the NMP.
Id.
88. Under the provisions of Section 1312 of the Code, it would appear that so
much of the rates collected from the customers that produced a return in excess
of a fair return would have to be refunded to the customers. Accordingly, it
is my opinion that the Commission does not have the requisite authority to
enter an order which would permit a utility to retain any part of its earnings
in excess of a fair return on the fair value of its property used and useful in the
public service.
Breezewood A.LJ. Opinion, supra note 84, at 184. See also 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301,
1312 (1990).
89. See Breezewood, supra note 82 (Opinion and Order).
90. Breezewood Dissent, supra note 84.
91. Id. Fischl stressed the practical result of the rate proceeding from BTC's perspective. See
id at 4. As a result of the nine month litigation, the majority of BTC's customers would receive a
decrease in their monthly dial-tone charge. Id. The company itself, having already spent $2.5
million in network improvements, received a rate increase of less than a third of its legal fees. Id.
"While the Commission and the various parties debate, the investment flows elsewhere." Id. at 5.
92. Specifically, the debate concerns the ratemaking provisions of the Code in Title 66. See 66
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (1990).
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is based on the natural monopoly theory of ratemaking and therefore does
not expressly authorize the PUC to deregulate sufficiently competitive
services.93 In addition, Pennsylvania courts have consistently interpreted
the ratemaking provisions of the Code as linking "just and reasonable"
rates to a rate-of-return methodology." On the other hand, opponents
of regulatory reform argue that the present Code does not prohibit LECs
from developing an advanced telecommunications network. 95
The PUC's limited departure from rate-of-return regulation for
resellers and interexchange carriers has created additional uncertainty
about the limits of the PUC's power under Pennsylvania's Public Utility
Code.96 Nonetheless, it is increasingly apparent that broad-based reform,
including a significant departure from cost-of-service ratemaking, is
necessary to compete with the aggressive deployment schedules of other
states and nations.97  Changes of this nature would require a
reinterpretation of Pennsylvania's longstanding regulatory practices.
Pennsylvania's General Assembly recognized the need for comprehensive
regulatory reform in June, 1993 when it passed legislation authorizing the
PUC to deregulate competitive LEC services and implement alternative
regulation plans for noncompetitive LEC services.98
VI. Pennsylvania and Other States: Alternatives to Rate of Return
Regulation
Advances in telecommunications technology have created an
information-based economy that does not respect traditional geographic
or political boundaries. Telecommunications infrastructure development
has been viewed as a gateway to the global economic marketplace. 99 As
a result, interstate and international competition has developed to deploy
93. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 3-20. Once an entity is subjected to PUC regulation
as a natural monopoly, it is by nature noncompetitive. The Code makes no provision for altering a
utility's regulatory status in response to changes in market conditions. The result is the present
quagmire-the PUC must regulate competitive services as if they were inherently monopolistic.
94. See, e.g., Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 562 A.2d 414 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989) (applying used and useful principle to regulation of all Pennsylvania utilities); Lower Paxton
Township v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n., 317 A.2d 917,920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (finding
just and reasonable rates as fair value of property used and useful in public service).
95. Hearings, supra note 41 at 2-3 (statement of David W. Rolka, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission); Hearings, supra note 41, at 1-2 (statement of Irwin A. Popowsky,
Consumer Advocate of Pennsylvania).
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97. See infra part VI.
98. See Act 67, supra note 8.
99. See supra note 1.
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a highly advanced network capable of meeting still undetermined future
needs.'0
Other nations have been aggressively deploying advanced
telecommunications technologies for many years.'" In 1989, Japan
spent nineteen percent more on telecommunications per capita than the
United States."° France's Minitel program, which was instituted in the
early 1980's, now provides over 500 advanced information services to
business and residential customers and includes the world's most
comprehensive public videotex system." 3
Although the FCC has taken several steps to encourage network
modernization and to react to increasing competition among service
providers, the primary regulatory authority for LECs rests with the
states.1 °4 Most states have taken steps to reform the traditional methods
of LEC regulation and twenty-eight states have significantly departed
from rate-of-return regulation. 0 5 The exact nature- of these reforms
vary widely from state to state but can generally be classified as
deregulation,"°6  incentive or alternative regulation, 7  social
contracts'0 8 and price regulation."° The challenge for state regulators
is universally the same-to encourage the modernization of the PSTN,
promote meaningful market competition, and protect consumers from
monopolistic pricing practices.
100. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-4.
101. Japan has set national telecommunications investment targets, which include the deployment
of fiber-optic networks to every business and home in the country. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note
4, at 1-41. Japan recently adopted the "Technopolis" program, which calls for the development of
"smart cities" that will use a combined fiber and satellite network. Id. In addition, the Japanese are
establishing regional information hubs which will serve as platforms for economic development on
a national basis. Id
102. Id at 1-42.
103. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-43. More than 95% of France's large businesses
and 75% of small businesses in the country utilize the Minitel network. Id. Videotex is an
interactive information system that is broadcast over the PSTN and received on adapted television
receivers. Id. at F-9.
104. The Federal Communications Act created a dual regulatory scheme for the
telecommunications industry. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Interstate services are primarily regulated
by the FCC, while intrastate services fall within the purview of the states. See NTIA REPORT, supra
note 1, at 260.
105. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-46.
106. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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Several states have completely or partially deregulated LECs."10
In 1986, the Nebraska Legislature completely removed LECs from rate
regulation."' Nebraska's deregulation scheme is comprehensive; it
makes no distinction between competitive and noncompetitive
services."' A Nebraska LEC is required to notify its affected
customers of a rate increase sixty days in advance.113  Moreover, the
Act does not require LECs to invest in modernization and to develop
advanced network services.'1 4  The Nebraska Public Service
Commission has limited authority to investigate local exchange rate
increases."1 5
Nebraska's experiment with deregulation has been credited with
advancing the deployment of new technologies and creating a statewide
boom in information-intensive industries." 6  However, Nebraska's
policy has also been criticized for not decreasing the state's higher basic
service costs." 7  Deregulation has been blamed for creating a
nonuniform network which deprives rural communities of the benefits of
enhanced services." 8
Unlike Nebraska, most states have not completely removed LECs
from traditional rate regulation. Many states have adopted alternative or
incentive regulation plans that relax earnings restrictions on competitive
services, provide a variety of consumer safeguards against unfair pricing
and competition, and still maintain a modified rate-of-return scheme for
110. Some of the states that have completely or partially deregulated LECs include Nebraska,
Iowa, Montana, Oregon and Nevada. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-47 to 1-53.
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-803(1) (1991).
112. Id.; see also Rathbun, supra note 1, at 13.
113. NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-803(2) (1991). In contrast, Iowa and Nevada have instituted service-
specific deregulation. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-50. Iowa has deregulated more than
fourteen "competitive" services since 1983, and market competition has taken the place of traditional
rate regulation for these services. IU; Rathbun, supra note 1, at 13.
114. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 13.
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-803 (1991). Specifically, the Commission may only investigate rate
increases which exceed a statutorily defined figure, id. at § 86-803(7), or if a specified percent of a
company's subscribers sign petitions requesting review, id. at § 86-803(3). See also PRICE
WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-55.
116. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 13. Omaha, Nebraska has become the "800 number capital of
the world," id. at 13, with over 10,000 jobs in the telecommunications industry and an unemployment
rate below three percent. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-57. More than four percent of the
state's jobs are now somehow related to the telecommunications industry. Id. In addition, advanced
services and network modernization efforts have continued to expand in the absence of rate
regulation. Id.
117. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 14.
118. Id. Nebraska's LECs have been criticized for not investing uniformly in network
modernization. Id. The bulk of investment has occurred in the Lincoln and Omaha regions. Id.
Still, the relatively high costs of basic service may be partially justified by other factors, including
the length of the local subscriber loop and the rural character of the state. Id.
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non-competitive services.19 In some cases, earnings above the
permissible rate of return or range of returns are shared between the LEC
and its ratepayers.'20 New Jersey recently passed legislation authorizing
a departure from rate-of-return regulation and permitting LECs to petition
the Board of Regulatory Commissioners for alternative regulation
plans.' 2 ' The Act also establishes a framework for careful regulatory
monitoring and strictly prohibits the cross-subsidization of competitive
services." Alternative regulation plans, such as the one now being
implemented in New Jersey, provide long-term price flexibility to LECs
and stimulate the deployment of fiber-optics and other new
technologies."'z  However, the New Jersey proposal does not set
specific deadlines for network modernization and does not guarantee that
all regions of the state will benefit equally from the increased
investment. 124
119. Many states have adopted some form of incentive regulation, a broad term which involves
the modification of rate-of-return regulation and a limited departure from cost-of-service principles.
Incentive plans often entail one or more of the following: relaxed regulation of competitive services,
alternative forms of regulation for noncompetitive services, and the sharing of earnings above a
defined rate of return between a carrier and its ratepayers. Some of the states that have enacted
proposals of this nature include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-50. Many of the plans
listed above also incorporate "banded rate of return" proposals, where regulators set a range of
returns, above which the company is required to share profits with its ratepayers. See id.
120. See Rathbun, supra note I at 8; Shooshan, supra note 10, at 14.
121. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 48:2-21.16 (1992). The legislation codified a 1987 Rate Stability
Plan for New Jersey Bell which was previously approved by the Board of Regulatory Commissioners.
122. Id at 48:2-21.18. Because certain services, such as basic residential telephone service, are
still provided on a monopoly basis, consumer protection is a key component of any regulatory reform
proposal. Like many other states, New Jersey's Act forbids LECs from engaging in cross-
subsidization, or subsidizing the cost of competitive services with revenues derived from regulated
noncompetitive services. Id. In addition, LECs must "unbundle" their costs to account for the
individual service elements involved in providing a particular competitive service. Id; see note 161
for an additional discussion of "unbundling." Competitors are given the opportunity to purchase the
unbundled service elements needed to provide network services directly from the LEC under
predefined terms and conditions. Id; see also Rathbun, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing the inherent
difficulties of strict cost allocation and the harmful effect of cross-subsidization on market
competition). The cross-subsidization problem has long been a primary concern of opponents of
regulatory reform in Pennsylvania, See Hearings, supra note 41, at 4-5 (statement of Gerard F.
Boyle, Chairman, Pennsylvania Cable Television Association).
123. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-69.
124. New Jersey Bell's recently approved network development proposal included plans to spend
$1.8 billion over the next five years to develop an all-digital switching network. Id. New Jersey Bell
has also proposed the employment of price regulation for noncompetitive services after 1996. Id.
New Jersey's cable television companies adamantly opposed the plan, citing the lack of adequate
consumer and competitive safeguards, concern over potential rate increases, and insufficient market
competition for "competitive" services. Id.
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Several states have opted for a social contract ratemaking scheme,
which authorizes LECs to negotiate short-term pricing and modernization
reforms with state regulators.'25 Vermont approved a social contract
with its principal LEC in 1988.126 In exchange for freedom from rate-
of-return regulation, New England Telephone agreed to freeze basic
service rates and invest $248 million in infrastructure modernization over
a two-year period. 27 However, due to the short-term nature of the
social contract approach, "the extent to which Vermont is prepared to
reform its regulatory process permanently is unclear and will likely
depend on the end result of this important first step. ' '
On the federal level, the FCC has replaced rate-of-return regulation
with price caps, a common form of alternative regulation.!29 Price
regulation concentrates on the price of a particular network service, rather
than focusing on the carrier's earnings."3°  Price caps are a unique
alternative to rate-of-return regulation because they simplify the
regulatory process, encourage network modernization, and provide a
flexible and predictable pricing scheme for LECs.'3 ' Price regulation
encourages innovation and investment and many states have incorporated
price caps, especially for noncompetitive services, into their alternative
regulation plans."
Pennsylvania's new regulatory reform legislation contains a variety
of all of these elements and can properly be classified as an alternative
125. See Rathbun, supra note 1, at 14.
126. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 226(a) (1989).
127. Rathbun, supra note 1, at 14. The social contract approach in Vermont protects ratepayers
through guaranteed rate stability, and at the same time, requires a specific level of network
investment. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 226(a) (1989). In this way, regulators can guarantee that
an advanced and uniform network will be built. In Vermont, the $248 million committed to network
modernization must be spent or refunded to ratepayers. See Shooshan, supra note 10, at 14.
128. Shooshan, supra note 10, at 14.
129. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873 (1989).
130. See Shooshan, supra note 10, at 15-16. Price caps are a common component of alternative
regulation plans. Under price regulation, a carrier must limit its price increases to an established
price index. Price caps have been proposed in New Jersey to regulate noncompetitive services under
the state's newly enacted regulatory reform legislation. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at
1-67. Pennsylvania's regulatory reform law also contains a price stability mechanism that allows the
PUC to use price indexes or formulas to limit the increases in an LEC's total annual revenues from
noncompetitive services. See Act 67, supra note 8, at § 3004(d)(2).
131. See Kahn, supra note 10, at 16. Price regulation mitigates the cost-plus character of rate
regulation through its focus on prices rather than a utility's earnings. See id. In addition, price caps
give the regulated entity more incentives to improve efficiencies, control costs and invest aggressively
in network modernization. See id. Such investment would typically have been considered too risky
under a rate-of-return approach. See id.
132. California, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee are a few of the states that are either considering or have already
implemented some form of price regulation. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-50.
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regulation scheme.1 33  The Act deregulates services that the PUC
determines are sufficiently competitive.34 At the same time, LECs may
submit alternative regulation plans to the PUC for the regulation of
noncompetitive services. 135 The PUC is authorized to approve
alternative regulation plans after carefully considering the plan's impact
on rates and service prices." The new law contains a strong
expression of legislative intent that a price stability mechanism should
limit the fluctuation in an LEC's total annual operating revenues from
noncompetitive services to 2.25% less than the Gross Domestic Product
Price Index (GDPPI) in order to gain PUC approval. 37  In return for
relief from traditional rate regulation, participating LECs must also
commit to specific network modernization schedules, including the
development of a universal fiber-optics interoffice and distribution
network by the year 2016.138
As exemplified in the PUC's Breezewood decision, Pennsylvania's
progress toward regulatory reform has been slower than that of many
other states. 39  Pennsylvania's neighbors, Ohio and New York, have
both implemented significant regulatory reforms,"4 and New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia and Virginia have modified
traditional rate-of-return regulation with either price caps, social contracts
or earnings sharing plans. 4t  Based on present levels of network
development and investment, Pennsylvania will fall behind many of its
neighbors in making advanced services available to subscribers through
133. See Act 67, supra note 8.
134. Id. at § 3004(D)(3).
135. Id at § 3003.
136. See id. at § 3004.
137. The language in Act 67 should prove helpful for LECs seeking guidance on the range of
alternative regulation proposals that might gain PUC approval under the new law. The new law
unequivocally states that:
[A] price stability mechanism that allows total annual revenues from noncompetitive
services to increase or decrease from the previous year's total revenues for noncompetitive
services as a result of tariff rate changes based on the annual change in the Gross
Domestic Product Price Index, as calculated by the United States Department of
Commerce, minus 2.25% may meet the requirements of this section.
Act 67, supra note 8, § 3004(D)(2).
138. Id, at §§ 3003-3007.
139. Until the passage of the 1993 regulatory reform legislation, Pennsylvania was among a
distinct minority of states that had not undertaken any significant regulatory reforms. See PRICE
WATERHOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-51.
140. Id at 1-69, 1-73. Ohio law gives the Commission total flexibility to adopt incentive
regulation plans or deregulate services when appropriate or both. Id. New York has approved a
price cap plan for Rochester Telephone, the state's second largest LEC. Id.
141. Id at 1-67 to 1-71.
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the PSTN.1 42  Pennsylvania's newly enacted statute authorizing
alternative forms of regulation for LECs has provided an effective
framework for regulatory reform. The PUC now has the opportunity to
use its new statutory authority to spur network modernization and make
the Commonwealth a national leader in the provision of advanced
telecommunications services.
Opponents of regulatory reform in Pennsylvania have cited the need
for consumer protection and the inability of alternative regulation plans
to establish a meaningful framework for market competition. 143 Cable
television companies argue that they can install fiber to the home more
cheaply and efficiently than LECs. t' They claim that a regulatory
policy which relies on the PSTN for the provision of enhanced
telecommunications services is inherently biased. 145  Pennsylvania's
newspaper publishers share these concerns, and fear that exploitive
pricing and unfair competition will result if LECs are permitted to
"control both the conduit into every home and the content flowing
through it.""t
142. PRICE WATER.HOUSE, supra note 4, at 1-73 to 1-77. A 1991 Pennsylvania Chamber of
Business and Industry study utilized the following factors to compare the telecommunications
infrastructures of the Mid-Atlantic states: (1) the percentage of digital access lines statewide; (2) the
percentage of Signaling System 7 (SS7) access lines statewide; (3) the percentage of SS7 central
office switches; (4) the percentage of fiber sheath miles statewide; (5) the percentage of fiber working
channels; and (6) the capital expenditures for modernization, growth and replacement per access line.
IU
143. During hearings of the House Consumer Affairs Committee on earlier regulatory reform
-legislation for LECs, representatives of the Consumer Advocate, the Pennsylvania Newspaper
Publishers Association, and the Pennsylvania Cable Television Association stressed the importance
of protecting consumers from monopolistic pricing practices, the need for fair competition in a
rapidly changing marketplace and the state's inability to predict the future shape and structure of the
telecommunications marketplace. See Hearings, supra note 41 (statements of Irwin A. Popowsky,
Consumer Advocate of Pennsylvania; James E. Dible, Chairman, Telecommunications Subcommittee
of the Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers Association; Gerard F. Boyle, Chairman, Pennsylvania
Cable Television Association).
144. See George Gilder, Cable's Secret Weapon, FORBES, April 13, 1992, at 80.
145. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 41, at 2-3 (statement of Gerard F. Boyle, Chairman,
Pennsylvania Cable Television Association) (arguing against adoption of statewide regulatory policy
which would restrict ability of cable operators to deploy fiber-optic cable and comparing effects of
cable fiber with fiber-based services provided by LECs).
146. See Hearings, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of James E. Dible, Chairman,
Telecommunications Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers Association). The
Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers Association (PNPA) argues that any major departure from rate-
of-return regulation would permit LECs to compete directly with newspapers for a limited pool of
advertising dollars. "Newspapers certainly acknowledge that a day will come when people might get
their news without a printed product .... But for our state government to embrace the telephone
company as both the conduit for and the provider of that information is frightening." Id.
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The pace of technological improvements, the link between
telecommunications and economic development, and the efforts underway
in other states all necessitate swift action by the PUC in approving
alternative regulation proposals and ensuring the development of a
uniform and advanced telecommunications infrastructure in Pennsylvania.
The concerns of Pennsylvania's newspaper and cable television industries
are appropriate and genuine. However, the PSTN is the only existing
communications system that reaches all of Pennsylvania's businesses and
over ninety-seven percent of the state's residential households. t47 As
a result, the PSTN is the logical and most effective focus of any
statewide reform effort. Still, any alternative regulation proposal
approved by the PUC must carefully balance the need for network
modernization with the protection of basic ratepayers and the promotion
of fair competition among alternative technologies and service providers.
VII. A Prescription for Reform: The Key Elements of a Regulatory
Reform Plan for Local Exchange Carriers in Pennsylvania
The deterioration of the natural monopoly characteristics of LECs
has made rate-of-return regulation incompatible with Pennsylvania's
future economic and social needs. Cost-of-service ratemaking must be
replaced, and Pennsylvania's newly enacted alternative regulation statute
provides a genuine opportunity for productive regulatory change.
Alternative regulation proposals approved by the PUC under the new law
should meet three key objectives: (1) provide adequate incentives for
swift network modernization; (2) protect ratepayers from monopolistic
and unreasonable pricing practices; and (3) promote fair competition
between alternative technologies and service providers.
A. Modernize the Public Switched Telephone Network
Regulatory reform in Pennsylvania should guarantee that a uniform,
statewide advanced telecommunications network will be constructed by
LECs. The PSTN is essentially a public commodity that has been
constructed with private dollars. It is the only uniform and universal
communications system in Pennsylvania and is therefore the natural focus
of any regulatory reform effort.1" The aim of regulatory reform is to
give LECs sufficient incentives to invest private dollars in the
modernization of the public network. With a proper regulatory structure,
147. See FCC INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS DIVISION, TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES (1992).
148. See note 4, supra.
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a modernized network will serve as a valuable conduit for competition
between different service providers and technologies.
Social contract plans, such as the one in place in Vermont, exchange
rate relief for guaranteed levels of network investment. 49 As part of
any alternative regulation proposal, the Pennsylvania legislation should
require the PUC to ensure that precise time frames for network
development are established. In this way, the General Assembly can
ensure that the tangible benefits of a broadband, digitally-switched
network capable of carrying voice, data, and video transmissions reach all
regions of the state.
In conjunction with network modernization schedules, alternative
regulation proposals should also provide for the deregulation of
competitive LEC services. The natural monopoly theory is no longer
applicable to many of the services now being offered by Pennsylvania's
LECs. In the new alternative regulation statute, the General Assembly
recognized that regulation was originally intended to be a substitute for
free competition. Under certain conditions, the law authorizes the PUC
to deregulate services that are deemed sufficiently competitive."5 Of
course, the PUC must be wary of the inherent difficulties in determining
whether sufficient competition exists to warrant the deregulation of a
particular service. Pennsylvania's alternative regulation statute includes
safeguards to allow the PUC to monitor market conditions and to
reclassify services when appropriate.
15 1
Alternative regulation plans should only be authorized for services
which the PUC determines to be noncompetitive. Regulation is still
needed where market competition does not exist, but Pennsylvania should
not be forced to permanently accept only rate-of-return regulation or
variations of cost-of-service ratemaking. Instead, the PUC should have
the authority to tailor ratemaking plans to meet the individual needs of
Pennsylvania's diverse LECs. The regulatory focus on costs and earnings
should be deemphasized in favor of a price cap approach. Price
regulation simplifies the regulatory process, mitigates the inherent
problems of cost-plus ratemaking, and provides ample incentives for
network modernization and investment. 52  However, if an LEC so
desires, the Commission should be able to approve and implement other
incentive regulation plans.'53
149. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
150. Act 67, supra note 8, at § 3004(D)(3).
151. See generally, id. at § 3004.
152. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
153. Pennsylvania's statute gives the PUC ample authority to authorize a wide range of
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B. Protect Ratepayers
The departure from rate-of-return regulation should not diminish the
importance of the PUC in protecting ratepayers from exorbitant telephone
rates and unreasonable pricing policies. The PUC's role in monitoring
the quality and universality of telephone service is especially critical
when LECs provide both competitive and noncompetitive services. Any
alternative regulation proposal should incorporate a mechanism for PUC
review of service quality issues."
The exact safeguards needed to protect ratepayers from unfair pricing
policies depend upon the regulatory scheme employed for individual
LECs. For example, price caps place inherent indexed limits on a
carrier's rates. Consequently, carriers regulated under a price cap
approach should be subject to price scrutiny by the PUC only to the
limits of the regulatory scheme. To the greatest extent possible, the PUC
should allow market forces to regulate the price of competitive services.
However, the PUC must have the discretion to investigate service quality
complaints for both competitive and noncompetitive services and to set
minimum service quality standards for Pennsylvania's LECs. For
instance, under the new Pennsylvania law, the PUC is permitted to
reclassify competitive services as noncompetitive and to regulate them
according to an approved alternative regulation plan.'55
An initial rate freeze for basic services should be incorporated into
any network modernization proposal. In accordance with the national
universal service policy, LECs should agree not to raise rates, at least in
the short-term, for basic residential telephone service. Ultimately, the
benefits of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure will pervade
all aspects of society. However, fairness dictates that the large short-term
costs of enhanced network services should be borne primarily by those
who benefit from them. 156 Customers who utilize only dial-tone service
alternative regulation proposals and to reclassify services when appropriate. See generally Act 67,
supra note 8, at § 3004. The law also provides specific guidance on the types of price stability
mechanisms that are likely to gamer PUC approval. Id. at § 3004(D)(2); see also id. at § 3006.
154. Under the new Pennsylvania law, the PUC retains its authority over service quality
standards. See Act 67, supra note 8, at § 3009(b).
155. Id. at § 3005(d).
156. Basic services have historically been subsidized with revenues derived from the provision
of discretionary services through residual pricing policies. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
It is becoming increasingly clear to LECs that with greater competition for the provision of
competitive services, these artificial subsidies cannot be maintained. "Competition, on an admittedly
limited basis, exists even for local calling .... We can argue what the real cost is, but there is no
longer any realistic dispute that basic service is today priced below cost." Hearings on Senate Bill
2, P.N. 2 Before the Pennsylvania Senate Committee on Communications and High Technology,
176th Leg., 1993 Session 4 (1993) (statement of Daniel J. Whelan, Vice President, Regulatory and
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in a residential context should not be unfairly burdened with a
disproportionate share of the costs of network modernization. "7
C. Promote Free and Fair Competition
Promoting competition should be a primary goal of any regulatory
proposal. Any alternative regulation plan approved by the PUC must
promote free and fair competition among alternative technologies and
service providers. Local exchange carriers should not unfairly control
both the development and use of the PSTN. On the other hand, LECs
should be able to compete fairly with other service providers for the
provision of competitive services. Moreover, the regulatory scheme
should not be so inflexible as to restrict market entry by carriers wishing
to compete with LECs for the provision of noncompetitive services.15
In this way, services that are now provided on a monopoly basis can
eventually be opened to market competition.
Any alternative regulation proposal must expressly prohibit cross-
subsidization and provide a mechanism to monitor alleged cross-
subsidization violations. LECs should not be permitted to subsidize their
competitive services with revenues derived from the provision of
regulated noncompetitive services. Act 67 gives the PUC broad
flexibility to establish rules to prevent cross-subsidization and ensure
proper cost allocation.'59  However, strict cost allocation is an
administratively complex and speculative effort which may not always be
necessary depending upon the form of regulation employed for particular
LECs.' 6 Consequently, the PUC should establish procedures to quickly
investigate alleged cross-subsidization violations without placing undue
administrative burdens on LECs.
Pennsylvania must develop an open network architecture (ONA) to
encourage alternative providers to utilize the PSTN to compete with LECs
on a service-by-service basis.' 6' In an open network, competitors are
Governmental Affairs, Bell of Pennsylvania).
157. Because many small LECs in Pennsylvania already have skewed rate structures, a hardship
exemption for small companies might be considered in order to ease the transition from the subsidies
of rate-of-return pricing to a competitive marketplace. In this way, small companies could raise rates
gradually over a number of years in order to adjust to the new market structure and invest in network
modernization.
158. Pennsylvania's alternative regulation law allows the PUC to authorize more than one LEC
for the provision of basic residential phone service. Act 67, supra note 8, at § 3009(a).
159. See id. at § 3005(g)(2).
160. Many supporters of price regulation argue that true price caps naturally prevent carriers from
cross-subsidizing competitive services. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1580
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
161. The FCC developed the ONA concept during its Third Computer Inquiry. See Computer
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guaranteed fair access to the public network and are given the opportunity
to purchase "unbundled" service elements at the LEC's cost.162  The
competing service provider is thereby given equal access to the PSTN and
is able to directly compete with the LEC. Act 67 requires the PUC to
establish uniform open network standards for the provision of competitive
services in order to promote meaningful competition between different
technologies and service providers.
63
VIII. Conclusion
The original natural monopoly characteristics of the local exchange
marketplace have steadily deteriorated over the past fifty years.
Advances in telecommunications technologies and the artificial subsidies
of residual pricing have significantly opened the market to competition.
Moreover, Pennsylvania's reliance on a fixed rate-of-return regulation
scheme discourages LECs from investing in network modernization.
The information age has arrived and it poses great challenges for
Pennsylvania's future economic and social welfare. The PUC must now
have the foresight and courage to walk the delicate public policy
tightrope between the need for network modernization, the protection of
basic ratepayers, and the promotion of meaningful competition in the
continually evolving telecommunications marketplace.
Pennsylvania now has the ability to depart from rate-of-return
regulation and adapt alternative regulatory strategies to compete
successfully in the information economy. The PUC must adopt
regulatory strategies that are comprehensive in scope, yet flexible enough
to respond to the rapid changes in the local exchange marketplace.
Curtis B. Toll
II, supra note 37 and accompanying text. ONA allows alternative service providers to connect to
the public switched telephone network at a stable and fair price. NTIA REPORT at 272-81. In
conjunction with the prohibition on cross-subsidization, ONA is intended to promote and improve
meaningful competition in the local exchange marketplace. See id.; see also PRICE WATERHOUSE,
supra note 4, at F6.
162. NTIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 272-81. "Unbundling" refers to the regulatory breakdown
of costs by service elements in the provision of competitive services. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 68 (discussing impact of unbundling on service competition in rural
areas). Unbundling encourages the use of alternative and new technologies and spurs price
competition. Id. The option to purchase necessary service elements at cost gives competitors the
chance to undercut the LECs wherever possible by offering individual services to subscribers at a
lower price.
163. See Act 67, supra note 8, at § 3005(e).
